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Application of Project Management in 
Ministerial Security Development
Technical Paper
After the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Defense focus turned to 
fighting terrorism throughout the world.  The U.S. entered 
into a conflict with Afghanistan to remove the Taliban govern-
ment which supported Osama Bin Laden and insurgent training 
camps.  In 2003, the U.S. expanded the “Global War on Terror” 
to include Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein and purge 
the country of Al Qaeda insurgents.  In both situations, govern-
ment functions were devastated and needed to be rebuilt.  This 
paper discusses applying a strategic to tactical, multi-dimen-
sional approach to project management to a Ministerial Security 
Development mission laying a foundational framework with 
developmental processes.  Although this paper focuses on the 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), the same approach applies to other 
Security Ministries such as Ministry of Interior and National 
Department of Security. This paper does not cover the “fight” 
element of contingency operations. The project management 
approach utilizes business models adopted by the Pentagon 
to establish organization operations. The U.S’s ability to estab-
lish effective MoD organizations in these regions is essential to 
a decreasing Department of Defense (DoD) budget particularly 
with Sequestration.  Self-sufficiency means less manpower by 
the Coalition Security Assistance Force (CSAF).  The lessons of 
Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that establishing Ministerial 
Security functional capability cannot be approached as a cam-
paign plan.  A project management approach provides the tools 
for business operations planning and allows for identifying and 
managing risks in a very uncertain environment.
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Introduction
The legitimacy of the Security Ass-
istance Mission and in particular the 
Ministerial Security Development mis-
sion is addressed in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS) for 2010.  As 
stated in the NSS, 
“the United States and the inter-
national community cannot shy away 
from the difficult task of pursuing sta-
bilization in conflict and post-conflict 
environments.  In countries like Iraq 
and Afghanistan, building the capac-
ity necessary for security, economic 
growth, and good governance is the 
only path to long term peace and 
security.  But we have also learned 
that the effectiveness of these efforts 
is profoundly affected by the capacity 
of governments and the political will 
of their leaders.  We will take these 
constraints into account in designed 
appropriate assistance strategies and 
will facilitate the kind of collaboration 
that is essential-within our government 
and with international organizations-in 
those instances when we engage in the 
difficult work of helping to bring con-
flicts to an end.” (White House, 2010)
The NSS specifically addresses the 
need that development is a strate-
gic, economic, and moral imperative 
requiring the focus on assisting the 
developing countries and their people 
to manage their security threats, intro-
duce global economic expansion, and 
establish accountable and democratic 
institutions that support basic human 
needs (White House, 2010). This objec-
tive is recognized in both CSAF efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As cited in the Master Ministerial 
Development Plan (MMDP), “the 
Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG) will 
develop the capabilities and capacity 
of the Ministry of Defense and General 
Staff in order to establish enduring 
institutions which can direct and sus-
tain Afghan-led security operations.” 
(Goodman, 2012).
CSAF Structure
The CSAF structure is broken into 
two elements: (1) equip, train, and 
advise and (2) Ministerial Leadership 
Development.  This approach tends 
to separate (1) equipment, training 
and advising of the equipment from 
(2) the role of advising on standing up 
processes for the Defense Ministry 
to determine equipment and training 
needs and budget and execute for 
those needs. This approach establishes 
the Ministry foundation sooner but is 
higher risk for the Assisted Nation to 
effectively assume the responsibility 
having less of an understanding for 
why processes and practices are imple-
mented.  The effort done concurrently 
would provide better understanding by 
the Assisted Nation.
Planning needs to be accomplished 
in conjunction with the Assisted Nation 
(Nation X for this paper) to facilitate 
“buy-in” and processes and practices 
meet the long term needs of the nation 
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for sustaining their security and sta-
bility.  The approach for managing 
projects in a dynamic environment, 
Simultaneous Management, suits 
Ministerial Security Development over 
the traditional project management 
approach.  The skill of negotiation and 
ability to influence is paramount to cre-
ating “buy-in” with the nation.  
The CSAF Organization Structure 
(Figure 1) needs to accommodate a 
critical alignment with the MoD lead-
ership to jointly establish the foun-
dation together.  This alignment is 
accomplished through the Ministerial 
Advisory Group (MAG).  A Program 
Management Office Structure, typi-
cally used in the DoD for acquisition 
and development of weapon systems, 
encompasses three primary elements: 
(1) Matrix of projects and competency 
support, (2) an Integrated Plan, and 
(3) Hierarchy Milestone Reviews. The 
MAG can assume the role of a Program 
Management Office with responsibility 
for the integration of all tasking across 
the CSAF.  Figure 1. 
A Project Management Office man-
ages a single project; a Program 
Management Office (PMO) man-
ages multiple projects.  A Portfolio 
Management Office manages sev-
eral programs and is typical of a 
DoD Program Executive Office (PEO). 
Management attention between the 
office types changes from a focus of 
execution within a project and tools of 
basic project management to manage-
ment across multiple programs and the 
breadth and complexity of meeting the 
organization’s mission and multiple 
stakeholders’ objectives. Ministerial 
Security Development fits the model 
of a PMO managing several projects 
which have defined interrelation-
ships.  With the incorporation of mul-
tiple PMOs, the mission at the CSAF 
level becomes a PEO.  The complexity 
of a PEO is driven by the increase in 
external focus on impacts, constraints, 
consequences, and results.  In order 
to better manage these multi-faceted 
elements, knowledge areas such as 
Strategic Management, Governance 
M anag e me n t ,  P e r f or mance 
Management, Communication Manage- 
ment, and Risk Management become crit-
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Matrix Structure
 An Integrated Management Plan (IMP) 
details the tasking for each CSAF Force 
Functional Command (FFC) and the 
relationships or linkages that exist 
creating the integration piece.  The 
PMO manages the integration of sev-
eral projects for establishing the Core 
Capability of the MoD.  As a minimum, 
these would be the foundational pro-
cesses or systems for managing Nation 
X’s Military Force:  Strategic Planning & 
Policy, Human Resource Management, 
Budget/Financial, Procurement, 
Logistics, and Institutional Training. 
Figure 2 depicts the complexity of mul-
tiple FFCs supporting multiple projects. 
Applying linear presentation to a matrix 
structure can appear chaotic and dif-
ficult to follow alignment of project to 
FFC participants. Figure 2
Figure 3 presents the same complex-
ity but in a two-dimensional matrix 
chart creating order and alignment. 
This visual representation conveys the 
cross-functional element of a matrix 
structure through a table of projects 
aligned with FFCs.  Figure 2 and 3 depict 
the difference in approach for visually 
depicting the same information. 
By adding the competencies of the 
FFCs, the structure becomes a three-
dimensional matrix represented in a 
two-dimensional form in Figure 4. The 
foundational systems (projects) may 
have a common thread for data collec-
tion, analysis, and feedback loop to 
apply the information in the next itera-
tion of operations.  The common thread 
element optimizes on common data 
collection for multiple applications. 
Competency participants that cross 
projects ensure this common thread 
to leverage commonality of systems to 
the greatest extent. Figure 4
To add further complexity, initiatives 
such as literacy, counter-corruption, 
gender integration, and civilianization 
require a comprehensive approach in 
planning and implementation. These 
cross-cutting initiatives cross projects, 
FFCs, and competencies creating a 
fourth dimension to the structure and 
execution Figure 5. 
Integrated Management Plan
The PMO defines the guidance for the 
FFCs to develop their piece of the IMP 
(Figure 6) through the collaborated 
agreements with Nation X’s MoD.  The 
PMO monitors the progress of the IMP 
activities and resolves cross-functional 
issues.  Each FFC manages their IMP 
activities and coordinates with PMO for 
the protocol for interaction with Nation 
X’s MoD. Figure 6
A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) can be drafted by each FCC to 
address the conditions needed for 
interaction and rationale with Nation X; 
both PMO and FFC leadership sign the 
MOU.  The MOU allows each FFC to oper-
ate more autonomously yet still within 
defined guidelines.  This is prudent in 
Ministerial Security Development to 
ensure a single message and direction 
is conveyed to Nation X’s Government 
leadership.  When the message appears 
ambiguous, Nation X’s Government 
leadership tends to exploit the oppor-
tunity to misinterpret the message to 
their advantage.  The more players 
involved the greater the risk that the 
CSAF’s direction is misinterpreted by 
Nation X.  This is a recognized risk in 
International Relations and is mitigated 
by a single message and direction of 
CSAF through PMO.
Utilizing a project management 
approach to Ministerial Security 
Development would ensure conti-
nuity of execution through the IMP 
built with Summary Tasks.  Detailed 
Joint 
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planning would occur in 6 month roll-
ing wave increments.  Project manage-
ment elements of risk management can 
be applied to manage the uncertainty 
inherent in building Nation X’s Defense 
Government Base while at war.  Risks 
such as availability of electricity, internet 
connectivity, culturally differing perspec-
tives can be identified and mitigated 
using standard risk management tech-
niques.  This approach would allow for 
budgeting of Summary Tasks and the 
tracking of cost performance associated 
with those tasks in addition to schedule 
performance.  Re-allocation of resources 
can be effectively managed based on the 
ability to meet capability parameters in 
some areas and respond to challenges 
in others.
An IMP would provide continuity to 
reduce the inefficiency caused by the 
Joint 


















x x x x x x x
Project 2




x x x x x x x
Project 4
Procurement x x x x x x x
Project 5














Force Managment & Force Development
Integrated Managment Plan













carol axten· application of project management in ministerial security development technical paper · pp 1099-1105
organization,  technology and management in construction ·  an international journal ·  6(3)20141104
turnover of personnel.  Few compa-
nies could stay in business with 100% 
turnover every year and possibly 50% 
turnover every 6 months.  An IMP with 
Summary Tasks scoped with Nation X 
would lay the foundation for detailed 
planning occurring in the 6 month incre-
ments.  Especially with multi-national 
support, good planning can reduce 
the friction created from ambiguous 
objectives and the need to “reinvent 
the wheel” throughout the mission.
Capability Milestones
To evaluate the progress of Nation X, 
metrics would be developed using 
quantitative measures to the greatest 
extent.  Qualitative measures should 
be applied based on understanding 
the limitations on interpretation. 
Significant movement in a rating 
capability would be presented to an 
Executive Ministerial Development 
Board (EMDB) (Figure 7) which is 
chaired by the Director for the PMO 
with leadership of all FFC.  The EMDB 
would collectively determine if a 
Capability Milestone (CM) has been 
achieved.  In the case when consensus 
cannot be reached, the Chairman has 
the final decision. At the beginning of 
the Ministerial Security Development 
effort, the EMDB would be Coalition-
led participation.  As Nation X’s lead-
ership reached pre-planned levels of 
capability, the participation would 
include Nation X and eventually shift 
to Co-Chairing the EMDB with joint 
participation in reviews and decisions.
Figure 7
In the early stages, quarterly 
reviews should be conducted by the 
Director of the PMO to the Ministerial 
Leadership:  Minister of Defense, First 
Deputy Minister, Chief of General 
Staff, and Vice Chief of General Staff 
to convey the progress and areas 
of concern.  As progress is made in 
Ministerial Development Leadership 
capability, the shift would occur to the 
Minister of Defense ultimately brief-
ing the Director for the PMO.  The IMP 
should include the roadmap in transi-
tion of responsibility of the EMDB as 
part of the PMO’s Summary Tasks. 
Each FFC would track the progress of 
the tasks, including how each of their 
areas are doing on literacy, counter-
corruption, gender integration, and 
civilianization both CSAF and part-
nering Nation X to meet the Capability 
Milestone.  Building infrastructure 
is often part of building the capabil-
ity in a Developing Government.  For 
example, establishing institutional 
training includes the physical build-
ing (construction), curriculum (train-
ing), and administration management 
(administration).  The IMP includes the 
tasks of the CSAF for infrastructure 
projects, tasks associated with Nation 
X, and all linked to Nation X’s Capability 
Milestone.  Nation X is required to pro-
vide land for the building; this would be 
a Summary Task assigned to Nation X 
with linkages to CSAF’s design and con-
struction of building.  This link creates 
the bond between the CSAF and Nation 
X in truly creating a partnership, one 
side cannot achieve success without 
the other.  An IMP can predict cost and 
schedule results for the entire project 
or program at any point in time. 
Another example is logistics, 
warehouses (construction) for stor-
age would need to be designed and 
constructed, land provided (Assisted 
Nation), and processes for receiving 
goods, storing, requisitioning, and 
distributing those goods (logistics) 
established.  Once the logistical foun-
dation is established and data is col-
lected, forecasting is accomplished 
using the historic data and a feedback 
loop can trigger automatic ordering at 
pre-determined points (contracting). 
Identifying personnel from Nation X 
and training them links the effort to the 
HRM system (personnel & education). 
In both examples, multiple competen-
cies play into achieving the End Result. 
These competencies will cross FFC as 
projects are executed from Strategic to 
Operational to Tactical levels to meet 
full security mission.  The IMP tracks 
Figure 7
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performance and predicts cost and 
schedule results for End State at any 
point in time.
The initiatives of literacy, counter-
corruption, gender integration, and 
civilianization would be included in IMP 
tasks and Capability Milestone rating 
for all projects, FCCs, and competen-
cies.  This method creates a compre-
hensive approach for initiatives to drive 
synergistic results to achieve security 
and stability of the nation; synergis-
tic results equate to the whole being 
greater than the sum of the parts.
Conclusion
In the report Learning from Iraq: A 
Final Report from the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, there 
were seven Final Lessons for Iraq 
summarized:
1. Create an integrated civilian-mili-
tary office to plan, execute, and be 
accountable for contingency rebuild-
ing activities during stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.
2. Begin rebuilding only after establish-
ing sufficient security, and focus on 
small programs and projects.
3. Ensure full host-country engagement 
in program and project selection, 
securing commitments to share costs 
(possibly through loans) and agree-
ments to sustain completed projects 
after their transfer.
4. Establish uniform contracting, per-
sonnel, and information manage-
ment systems that all Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SRO) participants 
use.
5. Require robust oversight of SRO activ-
ities from the operation’s inception.
6. Preserve and retire programs devel-
oped in Iraq, like the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program and 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
program that produced successes 
when used judiciously.
7. Plan in advance, plan comprehen-
sively and in an integrated fashion, 
and have the backup plans ready to 
go. (Bowen, 2013)
As cited in the above lessons learned, 
the need for a comprehensive approach, 
an integrated plan, and the participation 
in planning with the Assisted Nation 
are primary elements to success of the 
CSAF mission. This paper provides the 
concept of a Program Management 
Office Structure utilizing the Ministerial 
Advisory Group as the PMO due to their 
role as the advisory link to the Ministry 
of Defense.  The PMO will collaterally 
compile and manage the IMP while 
executing Ministerial Development 
Leadership. The paper also portrays the 
complexity of structure, planning, and 
implementation through a multi-dimen-
sional approach to achieve success in 
Ministerial Security Development. This 
approach provides both effectiveness 
and efficiency in implementation over 
establishing separate PMO and MoD-
MAG organizations.
The results of years of military pres-
ence in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced 
violence; however, this reduction is not 
truly tested until the external military 
presence is gone and the Nation must 
now sustain the stability and provide 
for their own security.  The death toll in 
Iraq has exceeded 8000 for 2013 return-
ing to the pre-U.S. military surge which 
significantly reduced and then leveled 
violence from 2009-2011 (Gamel, 2013). 
With neighboring Syria in a civil war and 
Libya still in turmoil from the civil war 
initiated during the Arab Spring 2011 
and the removal of Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia will remain on the International 
Security radar for some time. Although 
future security assistance initiatives are 
expected to be less extensive as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the need to bolster 
the MoD of foreign countries to provide 
security and stability for the nation will 
be a mission for the DoD for many years. 
The lessons in the execution of Iraq 
and Afghanistan provide insight into 
the long-term approach for Ministerial 
Security Development in the application 
of smaller contingency operations.
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